“Elements of the 1st Battalion of the Regiment landed exactly where they were supposed to: on and off the high ground overlooking the airfield about 5 kilometers northeast of the city of Gela. The 1st Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur F. Gorham, accompanied by elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 504th, engaged a Kampfgruppe[i] of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division at once. There were supposed to be no Germans (except a few technicians) on the island, and I could not believe the first reports that were coming in; the German Panzers were everywhere in large numbers. The troopers went to work and in a short while learned that the Panzer Infantry was quite manageable and our Infantry could stop them. The Tiger Tanks, though, were something else. Equipped with 4-112 inches of armor that on a slant amounted to 6 inches, and 88 MM. guns that the Germans used against the Infantry, and which was probably the most formidable antitank weapon in the world at that time; with an overall weight of 60 tons the Tiger Tank was something that one would never forget after the first encounter. The Germans launched their counterattack in two columns: the western column from the vicinity of Niscemi, and the eastern column from the vicinity of Biscari. This column contained a company of Tigers. It was this battalion that I became engaged with on the morning of July 11th. It was about 10 kilometers east of its planned objective and, from the outset, the German Panzer battle group was astride the road that we needed to get to our objective area where the 1st Battalion had landed. At the end of the day’s hard fighting we made a last counterattack, and the German Infantry broke and ran from the battlefield, and, thus, we were able to join with the 1st Battalion near Gela.”
[i] 1. The Kampfgruppe was an ad hoc combined arms formation, usually employing combination of tanks, infantry, and artillery (including anti-tank) elements, generally organiz1ed for a particular task or operation.
A Kampfgruppe could range in size from a corps to a company, but the most common was an Abteilung (battalion)-sized formation. Kampfgruppen were generally referred to by either their commanding officer’s name or the parent division.
On July 9, Allied convoys came together near the British-held island of Malta, and from there they made for the southern coast of Sicily. The landing craft were slightly delayed in reaching the island because of a storm, but in fact this also helped the Allies: the Italian defense forces had been placed on a lower than usual state of alert because it was thought that the poor weather would have made an attack unlikely. Simultaneously airborne troops of the US 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) and the British 1st Airlanding Brigade.
The location of the planned paratrooper landings was the vicinity of the U in the above map of the landing bases.
The first landings were made by the British, using more than 130 gliders of the Airlanding Brigade. Their task was to take control of a bridge, the Ponte Grande, some distance to the south of Syracuse. However, the landings were fraught with problems: 200 men were drowned when their gliders crashed into the sea, many more landed in areas away from their target, and only 12 landed in the right place. Even so, the British were successful in taking and holding the bridge.
Meanwhile, the American paratroopers were attempting a landing in the south west part of Sicily (just east of the port of Gela. This operation, too, went far from smoothly. Many of the pilots used had little experience of combat and a combination of this inexperience, dust being thrown up from the dry ground, and fire from anti-aircraft guns meant that the American paratroopers ended up quite widely spread, some landing as much as 50 miles away from their targets.
The planned and actual landing zones for the US paratroopers. (From Ready thde history for the 505th PIR in WW II.)
On Tuesday July 10, 2018 there will be several ceremonies celebrating the American assault on Sicily. The first will be at Ponte Dirillo where some of the paratroopers commanded by LTC Arthur F Gorham fought off 2 German counterattacks over the following several days near there. LTC Gorham was killed during those battles. (Ponte Dirlllo is located just south of where elements of 1-505 actually landed.) There will also be ceremonies in Gela and a reenactment of the naval invasion on the evening of 10 July. We will report from the scene.
The main assault on the Sicilian coast was a joint effort between British and U.S. forces, with American divisions attacking the western coasts and the British the east. Warships were based off the coasts in order to provide covering fire. The British forces had the easier time of the two groups, with relatively little fight being put up by the Italian defenders. This allowed the Allied guns and tanks to be landed quickly, and Panchino was in British hands by nightfall.
Meanwhile, the U.S. divisions on the other coast of the island had a much harder time of things, with both Italian and German airplanes offering strong resistance to the invasion. Later in the afternoon, a Panzer division of heavy Tiger tanks joined the defense, but the Americans managed to land 16th Regimental Combat Team and the 2nd Armored Division by evening. The U.S. forces succeeded in holding their ground until covering fire from the Navy drove off the tanks. The beach head was also protected by the brave paratrooper lead by LTC Gorham near Ponte Dirillo. Subsequently LTC Gorham’s small paratroop element was place under the command of the 16th Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division.
The Axis were misled by the widely scattered Allied paratroopers into thinking that the invasion was on a massive scale, and requested reinforcements. However, these did not make a difference to the eventual outcome. On July 12, Augusta had come under British control, and General Bernard Montgomery ordered his men to mount an attack on Messina to the north. Lt. General George S. Patton, who commanded the American 7th Army, did not agree with this change in emphasis and told his troops to head west instead.
The U.S. soldiers advanced steadily toward Palermo, a strategically important seaport. They met relatively little serious resistance and, by the time they had occupied the port on July 22, more than 50,000 prisoners had been taken. Control of Palermo allowed the 9th Division of the U.S. Army to make a landing there, rather than having to repeat a riskier southern assault; it also opened up a useful supply line for the Allies. Once this had been achieved, Patton was ordered by Alexander to go forward to Messina.
Many analysts have credited the planning and operational approach to operation Husky as making Normandy a success. Normandy was an invasion on a much larger scale and with many more troops but the approach was the same. The paratroopers’ mission in both operations was to isolate and protect the beach heads from enemy attacks so that there was time for the beach heads to be consolidated and the landing forces assuming the brunt of the battle.
The activities around Gela will be reported right after they happen.
Reports indicate that new legislation in the Senate proposes to authorize US military cyber warriors to go on the offensive against Russian attacks on the United States in cyberspace. It also mandates a cyber deterrence doctrine.
These same reports indicate that lawmakers were disappointed in the administration’s latest cyber policy. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s fiscal year 2019 defense policy bill designates clandestine military operations in cyberspace as “traditional military activities.” This affirms the secretary of defense’s ability to order cyber operations. A related section of the bill “authorizes the National Command Authority to direct US Cyber Command to take appropriate and proportional action through cyberspace to disrupt, defeat and deter systematic and ongoing attacks by Russia in cyberspace,” the report states:
(a) In General.—It shall be the policy of the United States, with respect to matters pertaining to cyberspace, cybersecurity, and cyber warfare, that the United States should employ all instruments of national power, including the use of offensive cyber capabilities, to deter if possible, and respond when necessary, to any and all cyber-attacks or other malicious cyber activities that target United States interests with the intent to—
(1) cause casualties among United States persons or persons of our allies;
(2) significantly disrupt the normal functioning of United States democratic society or government (including attacks against critical infrastructure that could damage systems used to provide key services to the public or government);
(3) threaten the command and control of the United States Armed Forces, the freedom of maneuver of the United States Armed Forces, or the industrial base or other infrastructure on which the United States Armed Forces rely to defend United States interests and commitments; or
(4) achieve an effect, whether individually or in aggregate, comparable to an armed attack or imperil a vital interest of the United States.”
There are several interesting aspects to this Congressional proposed strategic policy.
1. The concept of cyber deterrence as a doctrine.
2. That deterrence of cyber-attacks may also be achieved by the use of non-cyber responses.
The congress determining national security strategy is by itself unique. The formal authorization of a cyber deterrence doctrine opens the whole realm of what is deterrence?
My UCLA graduate school professor (Bernard Brodie who was one of the founders of deterrence doctrine thought of deterrence as” a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires. A credible nuclear deterrent, he wrote, must be always at the ready, yet never used.”
Subsequently the capacity to harm another state was to be a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state’s behavior. To be coercive or deter another state, violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation.
Deterrence is considered to consist of the capability to inflict such harm and the willingness to do so. Capability is the more easily demonstrated aspect of deterrence. It is achieved through observable tests, news reports or use. Willingness is the hard part to quantify. It is usually thought to consist of demonstrated use or as during the cold war some form of automaticity to the response. With the consequences of a major nuclear exchange being so great during the cold war and automatic responses discussed openly no side was willing to test the willingness of the other.
This lack of willingness to test the other side’s willingness became the source of moderation during the cold war. Simple escalation of the DEFCON or making advanced alert status visible was used as a method of signaling willingness.
How one is to signal willingness in the cyber world is a fascinating question. It may require some cyber ‘skirmishes.” Possibly these have already occurred.
As we go forward in the evolution of strategic thought the concept of cyber deterrence will require significant additional study and the response to questions, such as:
- What is the potential damage?
- What is the nature of escalatory steps?
- What are the defensive measures? (These will most likely be constantly changing.)
This article should open a dialogue of cyber deterrence. Please make your comments and check back for the comments of others.
For the last 2 weeks the North Koreans and the US have been playing many “cards” in their efforts to have the upper hand in Singapore. Let’s review the high points.
- The North Koreans walk out of a meeting with the ‘south Koreans and issue a searing critique of National Security advisor Bolton. The critique was against him personally, but more importantly the North Koreans were rebelling at the Libyan example—Kaddafi denuclearized and then 15 years or so he was overthrown by rebels armed and provided air support by NATO and then subsequently murdered. Not a good image to send the North Koreans.
- The North Koreans also slowed discussions about the summit.
- President Trump talked less positively about the probability of the summit and mentions the military option.
- The president send us a letter to Kim Jun Un that was very conciliatory and positive but cancelled the summit.
- However the President continues with a scheduled meeting with President Moon of South Korea. The two president talked about trade but one can be sure that they were seeking to show solidarity and soften the rhetoric.
- Today President Moon and Kim Jun meet in for 2 hours in Panmunjom and talked about the relations between the two Koreas. Some pundits of course argue that they can have a summit and don’t need President Trump probably because they don’t understand the “process”
- Sarah Sanders announced that the US advance team departs for Singapore tomorrow to prepare for the summit.
- Positive remarks are heard around Washington to include from the President
- There may be several more back and forths but unless the North Koreans play a strong antagonistic card one can expect a reversal of the cancellation this coming week.
The search for an advantage will continue by both sides but it looks like there will be a summit.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Monday that the Trump administration will embark on an “unprecedented” pressure campaign against Iran meant to fundamentally change its foreign policy. Delivering his first major foreign policy address as top diplomat at the Heritage Foundation, a Washington think tank, Pompeo listed 12 sweeping and uncompromising conditions for a new nuclear deal with Tehran after President Donald Trump withdrew from an existing one earlier this month.
Pompeo said that the JCPOA put the world at risk because of its fatal flaws. Therefore the list of US demands is long” because Iran’s activities are bold in scope, “We didn’t create the list – they did.” There were reported to be twelve demands, but a thorough reading of his speech makes it 15: (the number doesn’t matter the message does)
- We will apply unprecedented financial pressure on the Iranian regime. The leaders in Tehran will have no doubt about our seriousness. The departments of Treasury and Commerce are already working on the sanctions.
- I will work closely with the Department of Defense and our regional allies to deter Iranian aggression.
- We will ensure freedom of navigation on the waters in the region. We will work to prevent and counteract any Iranian malign cyber activity. We will track down Iranian operatives and their Hezbollah proxies operating around the world and we will crush them. Iran will never again have carte blanche to dominate the Middle East.
- We will also advocate tirelessly for the Iranian people. The regime must improve how it treats its citizens. It must protect the human rights of every Iranian. It must cease wasting Iran’s wealth abroad. We ask that our international partners continue to add their voice to ours in condemning Iran’s treatment of its own citizens.
- Iran must declare to the IAEA a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear program, and permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity.
- Iran must stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing. This includes closing its heavy water reactor.
- Iran must also provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all nuclear sites throughout the entire country.
- Iran must end its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launching or development of nuclear-capable missile systems.
- Iran must release all U.S. citizens, as well as citizens of our partners and allies, each of them detained on spurious charges.
- Iran must end support to Middle East terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
- Iran must respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi Government and permit the disarming, demobilization, and reintegration of Shia militias.
- Iran must also end its military support for the Houthi militia and work towards a peaceful political settlement in Yemen.
- Iran must withdraw all forces under Iranian command throughout the entirety of Syria.
- Iran must end support for the Taliban and other terrorists in Afghanistan and the region, and cease harboring senior al-Qaida leaders.
These demands are broad in scope and in essence call for the end of Iran’s goal as to the creation of a caliphate across the Middle East from Egypt to Afghanistan. There are some wide ranging and probably on their face impossible to achieve. The center of gravity of his remarks appears to be a call for regime change. He said that we ask the Iranian people: Is this what you want your country to be known for, for being a co-conspirator with Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al-Qaida? The United States believe you deserve better.
With a regime change all of the other goals become more possible.
With a regime change all of the other goals become more possible.When one sees this hard line approach to Iran (North Korea’s partner or client in weapons building) he must wonder how Kim Jun Un he sees the on again of again upcoming summit. Kim responded negatively to President Trump’s Libya analogy, with cause. Things went well for Libya for about 10 years before the revolution stared and was supported by NATO with arms and air support until the government was overthrown and Qaddafi killed.
In this complex world such examples provide the wrong message to both the Iranians and the North Koreans.
As things progress in the processes that have been started with North Korea and Iran we will watch them with interest and report on them when needed and appropriate.
Just as I think that I have the process and its linkages figured out the North Koreans throw a curve ball! The cancellation of yesterday’s talks as a protest against US – South Korean previously planned military exercises may tell us some things about the process continuation.
The North’s official news agency said Pyongyang had called off high-level talks with Seoul. Citing first vice minister of foreign affairs the news agency said the fate of the unprecedented U.S.-North Korea summit, as well as bilateral relations, “would be clear” if the United States spoke of a “Libya-style” denuclearization for the North.
“If the U.S. is trying to drive us into a corner to force our unilateral nuclear abandonment, we will no longer be interested in such dialogue and cannot but reconsider our proceeding to the DPRK-U.S. summit”.
There are several possible messages here:
- There may be a power struggle between the hardliners and those in favor of denuclearization within the hierarchy of North Korea
- We may be witnessing the traditional North Korean drive a hard bargain approach, which is not incompatible with the first observation
- This may be a test of President Trump—how tough will he hang? Will he be willing to walk away?
Interestingly the dialogue with Secretary Pompeo by phone has continued. This is most likely just another negotiating gambit. However, the power struggle argument must be given serious consideration. The North Korean military is first in the “chow line” when it comes to the government distributing what little bit of resources that it has. If the military believes that this favored position will be threatened by denuclearization and the end of the “almost hostilities with the South and the US” then it may be trying to force a more belligerent and stronger position. It wants its share of whatever good comes form the summit.
Only time will tell.
Yesterday we published an analysis of the process leading to the meeting of President Trump and Kim Jung Un in Singapore on 12 June. This is an update on that analysis.
The north and south are meeting today in Panmunjon to further refine the issues of economic cooperation between the two Koreas.
This is a further part of the process. The process has two levels:
1. The north south issues
2. The denuclearization issues which is the US focus
Obviously the two levels of processes are interconnected and it will be impossible to work one process to a successful outcome without the other. The economic vitalization of North Korea is dependent upon the relaxation of sanctions and economic embargoes which is in turn dependent a denuclearization agreement.
Given these dependencies one can imagine a direct linkage between steps in the two. In other words, as certain steps are taken in denuclearization certain sanctions and embargoes will be relaxed. These connected steps will be detailed and require significant negotiation. /this suggests that the best one can hope for coming out of Singapore in 28 days is a broad agreement that sets the negotiation of the detailed linkages noted above. The agreement will have both sides make good faith actions immediately to establish a maintainable momentum.
As the details emerge in the coming days this framework should become more evident. Stay tuned.