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How the War in Ukraine May End
A year ago, I argued that the war in Ukraine had reached a strategic stalemate. Today I believe that stalemate is beginning to break—not because either side has achieved a decisive battlefield breakthrough, but because Ukraine is increasingly attacking the political and economic foundations that allow Russia to continue fighting. If this assessment is correct, the decisive battles of the war may ultimately be fought not only on the front lines but also within Russia’s economy and political system.
Russia’s battlefield strategy continues to impose enormous costs while producing only limited military gains. Despite heavy casualties, Russian forces have not fundamentally altered their reliance on mass infantry assaults reminiscent of earlier eras of warfare. Such tactics have become increasingly costly. The battlefield is now under near-continuous surveillance by drones, allowing Ukrainian forces to direct artillery and precision strikes against attacking formations before they can achieve meaningful maneuver. Russia continues to capture small amounts of territory, but only at a disproportionate cost in personnel and equipment.
Estimates of Russian casualties vary, but there is broad agreement that Russia has suffered exceptionally heavy losses in personnel, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery systems, and other military equipment while making only incremental territorial gains. The exact numbers matter less than the overall trend: Russia continues to expend manpower and matériel at a rate that appears difficult to sustain indefinitely.
Ukraine appears to have concluded that battlefield attrition alone is unlikely to end the war. Instead, it has expanded attacks deep inside Russia against oil refineries, fuel storage facilities, transportation networks, and other critical infrastructure. In military theory, these assets form part of a nation’s “center of gravity”—the economic and industrial foundations that enable military operations. Refineries not only supply fuel for military forces but also generate export revenues that finance the Russian state.
These attacks appear to be imposing increasing economic costs. Reports that Russia has imported gasoline refined in India from Russian crude oil illustrate the growing disruption to its domestic refining capacity. The longer refineries, ports, and other critical infrastructure remain damaged, the greater the economic burden of sustaining the war. Rebuilding these facilities requires time, skilled labor, and resources that cannot simultaneously support military operations.
The campaign against Russia’s economic infrastructure is complemented by Ukraine’s effort to isolate Crimea. Ukrainian strikes have increasingly targeted the bridges, ports, airfields, and logistical routes that connect the peninsula to mainland Russia. Even if Crimea is not immediately retaken, making it progressively more difficult to reinforce and supply raises both the military and psychological costs of maintaining Russia’s occupation. Losing Crimea, which Russia has controlled since 2014, would represent a significant symbolic and political setback for the Kremlin.
At the same time, Russia’s wartime economy presents a paradox. Military production has generated employment and stimulated sectors of the economy that had previously struggled. While war has become economically burdensome, ending it could also create severe dislocations as factories, workers, and government finances attempt to transition back to a peacetime economy. For the Russian leadership, managing such a transition could prove almost as difficult as continuing the war itself.
Even if Ukraine succeeds in increasing Russia’s military and economic costs, another question remains: what would persuade the Kremlin to stop fighting? Military losses alone rarely end wars when political leaders believe defeat threatens their own survival. That appears increasingly relevant in Russia. If Vladimir Putin and those around him believe that losing the war could result in imprisonment, exile, or even death, then the normal cost-benefit calculation changes. Preserving the regime becomes more important than preserving military forces.
This suggests that the true center of gravity may extend beyond Russia’s economy to the cohesion of its governing elite. Authoritarian systems often depend upon a relatively small group of trusted political, military, and security leaders. If that leadership becomes increasingly divided, isolated, or unable to replace experienced officials, the government’s capacity to continue the war may weaken even if substantial military forces remain in the field. Political instability, elite defections, or internal power struggles may ultimately prove more decisive than battlefield victories alone.
A similar dynamic may be observed elsewhere. Recent events involving Iran suggest that authoritarian governments can often replace senior leaders quickly unless disruption extends well beyond the highest levels of command. Removing a few senior officials rarely changes policy if an experienced leadership structure remains intact. Lasting political change generally requires weakening the institutions and networks that sustain the regime.
If this analysis is correct, the decisive struggle in Ukraine is no longer simply for villages, trenches, or even territory. It is increasingly a contest over whether Russia’s political leadership can continue to govern, finance the war, and maintain the loyalty of those around it. Military operations remain essential, but they increasingly serve the larger objective of undermining Russia’s capacity to sustain the conflict. Should those political and economic foundations weaken sufficiently, the war may ultimately end not with a dramatic military collapse but with political change in Moscow.
Strategic force moves in Europe
Secretary of Defense Esper recently announced new changes to the US basing posture in Europe that would result in more than 10,000 troops returning to the United States from bases in Germany, followed by a relocation of military personnel to Poland, Romania and Mons, Belgium. While most of the media attention has focused on the redeployment of forces from Germany back to the United States, a new strategic decision was made by the US that will result in an increased military presence in NATO’s new front yard: the Black Sea and Poland.
The globalists and Trump haters have been railing against the withdrawal and repositioning of US forces from Germany. These repositionings should be looked at in a strategic context, not the concerns of the Germans and their lobbyists.
Strategic realities have changed since the Cold War ended and NATO expanded to the east. Germany is no longer the frontline between NATO and the Russian bear. Germany is also no longer a staging area for deployment to the Middle-east. For the first Gulf War the US deployed an entire armor corps from Germany. It was reinforced by troops for the US. Today there is no need for such deployments as the Trump administration does not anticipate fighting another Gulf War.
Why should US troops be deployed for German security? What is the threat? Why can’t the Germans defend themselves? The Germans obviously felt that they could save on defense marks (dollars) by having US troops providing for their security. Following World War II troops were deployed in Germany to prevent another world war—the re-emergence of Nazism. This threat no longer exists. Since my time in the Pentagon in the 1970s US presidents have been trying to get NATO and Germany, specifically, to pay more for its own security.
President Trump claims that NATO has increased its defense spending by over $100 billion. This is part of his stated goal to stop being the world’s policeman. Conversely, the US does seek to maintain a deterrent posture vis-à-vis Russia (and in Asia against China). This deterrent posture requires different stationing schemes. So where are the troops from Germany being restationed?
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Polish Minister of National Defence Mariusz Błaszczak signed an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between their two countries in Warsaw on 15 August. President Trump and his Polish counterpart, Andrzej Duda, agreed to the overview of the provisions of the agreement in 2019. In addition, the US presence in Poland will be increased from 4,500 to 5,500 troops and infrastructure will be built to accommodate up to 20,000 US soldiers. Poland will cover some of the costs, such as those for infrastructure and logistics that are estimated at $136 million a year.
Esper announced that a US Stryker brigade would be sent to the Black Sea in what will be the first significant US military ground forces deployment to the region. The Black Sea has been the epicenter of Russia’s revisionist ambitions since its 2008 war with Georgia and its 2014 invasion and occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea and invasion of Donbass. To highlight the changes in US defense posture in the Black Sea, Esper described the move in the following strategic terms: “Look at what we’re moving. What we’re doing is … we’re moving forces out of central Europe — Germany, where they had been since the Cold War, and we’re now moving — we’re following, in many ways, the boundary east, where our newest allies are. So into the Black Sea region … That’s why it’s a strategic laydown that enhances deterrence, strengthens the allies, reassures them.”
These forward deployments enhance deterrence and realign forces to reflect the realities that is the new European of today. For globalists this is disturbing, for true strategists it is a final reflection of new realities. The US is putting the US first.
The changing strategic Middle-East situation
The recent announcement of normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel is now being followed with discussions between Oman and Israel. These changes suggest a new coalition between all of the Middle-Eastern states that see a threat in Iran. When one considers the oft repeated relationship between Israel and Saudi Arabia the future coalition will only grow. (Many reports that the Saudis offered Israel refueling and recovery airfields for any attack on Iran.)
What is driving this significant change in strategic relations? There are several factors:
- The US is no longer dependent on oil from the region
- US reduction of deployed forces in the region
- The Iranian nuclear growth towards nuclear weapons continues after a temporary setback because of numerous explosions throughout its nuclear weapon and delivery development system.
- The Israeli agreement to suspend plans for annexing parts of the West Bank—this was important as it was meant to appease the Arab support for a Palestinian state. (Political cover)
What should we look forward to as this situation develops?
- Iranian severe reactions to include terrorist attacks by Hezbollah and other Iranian funded organizations against Israel and probably UAE forces in Yemen.
- Increased pressure by Iran against Iraq—the meeting between the President and the Iraqi Prime Minister tomorrow should provide some indicator as to the direction Iraq will follow
- Some additional form of military coordination between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Israel to secure the Straits of Hormuz and the flow of oil to Europe and Asia.
- More GCC states joining the loose coalition that the Oman, UAE and Israel cooperation will create.
- Increased pressure on Qatar to sever its support of more radical Arab causes.
- Continued US naval and air presence in the area.
This historic breakthrough by acceptance of Israel as a recognized player in Middle-Eastern strategic affairs can only have stabilizing influences on the entire region over the long term. These may be preceded by the Iranian caused unrest noted above.
We will watch the future events for tells on what is to come next.
The economy or the people? Or Is the cure worse than the virus?
President Trump said Tuesday during a Fox News virtual town hall that he wants the country’s economy re-opened by Easter amid questions over how long people should stay home and businesses should remain closed to slow the spread of coronavirus. Speaking from the Rose Garden alongside others on his coronavirus taskforce, Trump said he “would love to have the country opened up and just raring to go by Easter.” The holiday this year lands on April 12.
The President also reiterated his argument that he doesn’t want “to turn the country off” and to see a continued economic downfall from the pandemic. “We lose thousands and thousands of people a year to the flu. We don’t turn the country off,” Trump said during the interview. He added: “We lose much more than that to automobile accidents. We don’t call up the automobile companies and say stop making cars. We have to get back to work.”
The President’s optimism of course is countered by all of the panic and anti-trump rhetoric of the media. Have you heard the media report the praise for the actions of the president from unlikely leaders like the governors of California and New York? Some of the closures are clearly the result of the panic created by the media. The rest is truly to ease of contagion of the virus.
The president’s prediction that the U.S. economy would be up-and-running by Easter, however, is tempered by comments earlier in the day by top officials at the Pentagon who predicted the COVID-19 outbreak could last anywhere from 10 weeks to three months.
Trump’s thoughts about getting people back to work sets up a potential conflict with medical professionals, including many within his government, who have called for more social restrictions to slow the spread of the virus, not fewer.
For weeks now, millions of Americans have been practicing “social distancing” in an effort to “flatten the curve” of increasing Chinese Coronavirus infections. Governors in California and New York have issued “stay at home orders” and closed “non-essential” businesses in an effort to stem the growth of the illness. Other states have made similar or more limited declarations or are considering them. Most states have ended the school year and are trying some form of remote education. This would be more practical if every school child had a computer and every home had the internet. (This will be the subject of a whole new article as I learn from the experience of our grandchildren.
While more than 40,000 Americans currently are infected with Chinese Coronavirus, hundreds of millions of others are suffering from the outbreak’s related effects. The U.S. economy is in shambles. The stock market has seen catastrophic losses. Out of an abundance of caution, millions of workers have been sent home. Thousands have been laid off. Restaurants and businesses have been shuttered, and many — especially small ones — may not re-open.
The negative financial impact of the shutdown/quarantine strategy gets worse every day. But are these widespread, but hopefully short-term, economic losses necessary? Will they avert a long-term economic crisis that could potentially kill hundreds of thousands?
As we come full circle from the Rose Garden’s hope of today about opening the country by Easter to the risk of opening the government prematurely maybe there is a compromise solution.
Some places like Wyoming and many of the other mid-western states have few cases of the virus. Many locales in even New York have few cases. Such an analysis of the country suggests that there are large pockets of minimal contamination. Also we know that the vulnerable population groups are the elderly and those with pre-existing conditions. Younger Americans my get the virus but the effects are minimal. This suggests another way to dice who can go back to work—non-threatened folks.
It is only smart to continue to limit large gatherings but many other social interactions can be resumed in selected locales.
To me the biggest threat while living is Kansas is flying on commercial aircraft. The airlines should use some of their stimulus money to devise methods of purifying the air inside their planes while they are in flight.
Of course travel is one of the biggest threats to the selective isolation that I have suggested (age and locale) as the virus can be brought from one of the isolated pockets to a relatively clear zone.
As the country and its leadership struggle with the dilemma pointed out here it would be terribly helpful if the media could stop the hate Trump rhetoric and substitute a support for America theme—why not try telling folks what is good? Or be truly complete in its reporting—“New York City is out of certain needed items because the administration forgot to order them and the government has not been able to fill all of its needs yet.” “Areas critically impacted are in New York, where they did not cancel Lunar New year celebrations.” Complete and accurate reporting and positive stories about women in Kansas making facemasks for a local hospital would also be nice to hear.
I ask my readers to consider the closure of the society and the risks from that versus the closure of the economy and the much longer and possibly worse impact from that. What is worse—some deaths from the virus or a depression?
Restructuring the Marine Corps
In the last several months the United States Marine Corps (USMC) has introduced a new vision for the structure of the Corps for 2030. This Marine Corps 10-year restructuring is to align itself with the National Defense Strategy, but in doing so, in my mind, it risks ignoring the last 70 years of its history.
The commandant of the Corps is seeking to transition the Corps away from its two-decade-long focus on counter-insurgency and towards the international competition that the national strategy poses as the greatest threats in the future. However, the commandant and other Marine Corps leaders are announcing that as part of this transition, they would eliminate/greatly reduce capabilities for sustained ground combat.
For example, as it gears up to fight China in this anticipated period of great power competition, the USMC will trim the size of its F-35 Joint Strike Fighter squadrons and cut all of its tank battalions in the next 10 years. It is also greatly reducing its artillery depending on increased lethality and accuracy of the remaining tubes. These changes, part of the 2030 force design effort, come as a result of the Corps’ wargaming and analysis effort meant to inform what it needs to fight a near-peer threat in 2030. According to the outline, the Marine Corps will cut the “the Primary Aircraft Authorized” for both the F-35B and F-35C squadrons down to 10 aircraft from 16. Also in the next 10 years, the Marine Corps is planning for “complete divestments of Law Enforcement Battalions, Tank Battalions and associated Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), and all Bridging Companies.” It will also greatly reduce its logistical support capability. Finally, it is seeking to move into the longer range missile field, as we reported, rather than rely on the Army which is also moving in that direction.
There are two risks in this force structure revision.
- The national command authorities will use the tools that they have available when a conflict arises. The Marine Corps they employ will not be dependent upon the Marine Corps’ capabilities or design at that time. The lack of diversity and flexibility in the capabilities to be applies could waste lives .This is not a new phenomenon. Look at the US Army that was deployed to Vietnam in the mid- 1960s. It was designed to fight the Soviets on the plains of the Fulda Gap.
- Why would the Corps want to be in a position where it cannot go to war without Army support for tanks, heavy firepower, logistics, and mobility? In short the changes undermine the Marine Corps’ expeditionary nature. The Army provides niche capabilities like psychological operations units and theater-wide logistics to all U.S. forces, not just the Marine Corps — the point is valid: The Marine Corps has been able to deploy and fight a wide variety of adversaries using its organic capabilities.
The Marine Corps should also avoid completely eliminating capabilities. Although the new guidance implies such eliminations, this creates gaps that might need filling in. Instead of creating these large gaps in capability the Corps should maintain in the Marine Corps Reserve an extensive toolkit as a hedge against an uncertain future. Traditionally, the Marine Corps reserves have been structured nearly identically to the active-duty force with a division, air wing, logistics group, and command headquarters. It is the only service that does this. The other services use the reserves to provide capabilities that are few or nonexistent in the active-duty force.
Thus, the Marine Corps could put capabilities into the reserves that don’t fit well with a western Pacific great-power strategy, but that would be needed for other kinds of campaigns. Using tanks as an example, the Marine Corps could reduce the number on active duty armored units to one company per division but keep an enhanced force of several battalion in the reserves. Personnel managers will whine that they cannot sustain the skill base with such a small active-duty community. The other services have figured out how to do this The Marine Corps can also.
Your thoughts?
New Howitzer Range
The Army’s improved Paladin 155 mm howitzer recently impressed officials at Yuma Proving Grounds. The tests sent an improved projectile to an altitude of 50,000 feet and a distance of over 40 miles. The goal is a range in excess of 60 miles.
Each armored or mechanized brigade includes a battalion of 18 such howitzers. However brigades are currently hard pressed to acquire targets independently out to 60 miles away. This suggests that other changes need to follow in intelligence acquisition and overall doctrine of how divisions and brigades will fight the battle.
I would ask my readers for their ideas/suggestions on changes on doctrinal and equipment that the new artillery capability will necessitate. Let’s hear from you.
Extension of the New START Treaty?
A senior US State Department official told a seminar in London on 11 February that there remains time for Russia and the United States to work through processes for extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that is due to expire in February 2021. There are several extension possibilities in the treaty.
Rumors are that John Bolton wanted to try and lure China into a tri-lateral nuclear control agreement. There are no rumors to date on what the president or his new National Security Adviser might be thinking. I know from personal experience that time is actually short to decide to try for a treaty extension and then negotiate it. Let alone add in the Chinese. There has not been any evidence of the agencies—State, Defense, Energy, or Intelligence—manning up for such an effort.
The New START Treaty is the only strategic nuclear arms control agreement still existing between the United States and the Russian Federation. It was negotiated by the Obama administration and approved by the Senate. It limits both sides to no more than 1,550 strategic offensively deployed nuclear weapons on no more than 700 deployed launchers. Further, it provides the United States with access to and information about Russia’s nuclear arsenal and vice versa. Both signatories are reportedly fully complying with the agreement, as verified by the U.S. intelligence community. The new nuclear capable missiles deployed by the Russians into Eastern Europe are not covered by the treaty.
The agreement entered into force in 2011 and will expire on February 5, 2021. However the agreement can be extended by executive agreement for up to five years, a step that would not require further Congressional approval. Both the Joint Chiefs and the U.S. intelligence community allegedly support such an extension. Russia, for its part, has repeatedly and unconditionally offered to extend the agreement.
The Trump administration has been in office more than three years and has yet to determine whether it is interested in extending the New START Treaty. It is easy to see the administration holding such a negotiation as a carrot for after the election. This might attract more moderates and some Democrats to support Trump. Conversely new allegations of the Russians meddling in the election and supporting Trump could dissuade the administration from offering such a negotiation lest it appear soft on the Russians.
It is in this context that one should consider any reports of interest by the US in negotiating a new broader multilateral strategic arms control agreement either independently or with both Russia and China. Some American military and security officials are reported to be eager to expand strategic conversations with Russia to protect American interests, and also right to want new and expanded strategic conversations with China, whose actions and capabilities pose growing military and security challenges to American interests in East Asia. Those that are eager feel that discussions are urgently needed to prevent conflicts and diffuse unnecessary tensions in volatile areas and develop new rules for our growing competition with these states.
Before going any further one must determine who the people are that are reported to be eager for such negotiations. To carry the day in the Trump administration they must be completely without any swamp smell.
What are the arguments for such an extension of the existing agreement and then its expansion into a tri-lateral agreement? It is well known that Russia is developing new strategic nuclear systems, some of which would be covered under the New START if it remains intact. Allowing the agreement to expire or trying to expand it in an unrealistic way and in an unrealistic time frame means Russia would be free after 2021 to develop as many of these new systems as it chooses without any constraint or rights of American access. Of course the US would have the same rights, but in a deficit cutting world there might be strong voices to avoid another nuclear arms race.
There is also nothing that prevents the Trump administration from extending the current agreement and at the same time beginning negotiations on new ones with Russia, China, or both.
As we go forward we will keep an eye on this area as there is the potential for much to happen..
Deployment of small yield nuclear weapons
Barely noted in most news reports but this past week, the US Navy announced that it had tested a new missile known as the W76-2. The Washington Times reports that the W76-2 is a “submarine-launched, low-yield device designed to counter Russia’s arsenal of smaller missiles and to give the US. a way to retaliate in kind.”
A DOD spokesman noted that: “In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the department identified the requirement to ‘modify a small number of submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads’ to address the conclusion that potential adversaries, like Russia, believe that employment of low-yield nuclear weapons will give them an advantage over the United States and its allies and partners.” The spokesman continued: “[The W76-2] strengthens deterrence and provides the United States a prompt, more survivable low-yield strategic weapon; supports our commitment to extended deterrence; and demonstrates to potential adversaries that there is no advantage to limited nuclear employment because the United States can credibly and decisively respond to any threat scenario.”
The “Nuclear Posture Review,” referred to is a document that the Trump Administration put forth outlining its position on nuclear policy. The Trump administration feels that during the previous administrations, Russia, in particular, has made advancements in its weapon’s arsenal, while the United States has not, which has caused some to believe that Russia may have the upper hand in this area. The Nuclear Posture Review was meant to address this.
The thinking underlying this review reads very much like deterrence theory of the cold war. The W76-2 is one of the first publicly announced results of that document. It reportedly gives America a way to combat the Russian advancements in low yield nuclear weapons. The thinking is that the deployment “strengthens deterrence and provides the United States a prompt, more survivable low-yield strategic weapon; supports our commitment to extended deterrence; and demonstrates to potential adversaries that there is no advantage to limited nuclear employment because the United States can credibly and decisively respond to any threat scenario.”
Proponents of the system believe the US needs a low-yield nuclear option in order to credibly counter Russia, which has invested heavily in a variety of nuclear systems in the last decade. Defense officials believe Russia would potentially use a smaller nuclear weapon in order to deter America from entering or extending a conflict, under the “escalate to deescalate” thinking; if the U.S. only has larger strategic weapons to retaliate with, it may hesitate. This hesitation would give the Russians an advantage the advocates of this thinking believe.
Opponents of tit for tat deterrence doctrine question whether such a doctrine is realistic, and also argue that no nuclear system can truly be non-strategic. These opponents have raised concerns that having a low-yield and high-yield warhead able to be launched on the same submarine-launched missile creates a situation where an adversary doesn’t know which system is being used and therefore reacts as if the larger warhead has been launched. This thinking makes the argument that a nuclear war can be limited to small yield exchanges questionable. Will an opponent wait until a war head detonates before acting? Assuredly no!
In short this means that deterrence is strengthened because low yield nuclear weapons can be used and there is no need to escalate to larger yield weapons because we do not have a comparable small yield weapon. The logic is pure cold war deterrence theory and is potentially flawed.
Additional concerns are that this is the beginning of a new arms race. An arms race that cannot be tempered by an arms control agreement. How does one verify yield of a nuclear weapon. In the past nuclear arms control agreements have focused on delivery vehicles (planes, and different kinds of missiles)… These are things that can be seen and counted. Warhead yield is quite another issue.
The deterrence theory argued above and the inability to control warhead yield give me pause. In arguing that smaller war head yield supports deterrence one can imagine the same argument for huge yields enhancing deterrence. Being able to limit a nuclear war has its advantages, but any nuclear war must be considered a catastrophic event.
Army–Navy (and USMC) roles and missions vice system conflict
As we previously reported on 20 October, “the Army is looking at extending the range of its Precision Strike Missile to 800 KM. This come following the dissolution of the INF Treaty which had limited ground based missile ranges to 500 KM. The Army’s Precision Fires Cross-functional team will ill conduct its first flight tests from two competitor companies before the end of the year. After the tests the Army will talk to the competitors about pursuing the extended ranges.”
This range extension is specifically oriented towards the ability to conduct operations in the Pacific from land based sites. Recently Jane’s has reported that the Navy and the USMC are looking at developing shore based Naval Strike Missiles. The concept is to take an existing sea based system and develop it so that it could be deployed on the land in support of USMC operations.
Inherent in the above are several inter-service conflicts.
- Do the naval strike missiles have the same capability as the Precision Strike Missiles that the Army is developing? If so are we seeing a duplication of effort and waste of resources?
- Is the island defense and land based missiles to assist in this an Army or USMC role and mission?
Presently the USMC does not contain any long range missile units while the Army does. It would thus appear that this is an Army mission—not a USMC mission. BUT
It would also appear the Naval Strike Missile could at least provide a start point for the Army Precision Strike Missile.
We would hope that the secretary of Defense will have these conflicts in roles and systems examined to save resources.
War power limitations on the president—putting the recent House resolution in perspective
The War Powers Resolution was passed in 1973 by both Houses of Congress, overriding the veto of President Nixon. It was passed to reassert Congressional authority over the decision to send American troops to war. After President Nixon ordered the bombing of Cambodia without Congress’s consent, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution of 1973, intended to limit the president’s authority to conduct war.
At the time, President Richard Nixon vetoed the bill on constitutional grounds, arguing that the measure would define presidential war powers “in ways which would strictly limit his constitutional authority.” Nonetheless, a two-thirds majority in each congressional chamber overrode the veto.
The War Powers Resolution requires the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing armed forces to military action and forbids armed forces from remaining for more than 60 days, with a further 30-day withdrawal period, without a congressional authorization for use of military force or a declaration of war by the United States.
There have been several instances when the President has not notified Congress within the required 48 hours. In the case of the attack on General Soleimani the Trump administration made such a notification. However it would be easy to argue that Congress has already authorized military activities in Iraq and therefore that such a notification was not required.
Yesterday Congressional Democrats, seemed blissfully unaware of then-President Barack Obama’s rather expansive interpretation of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 during his strategically disastrous 2011 operation to oust Libyan strongman Muammar al-Qaddafi, suddenly seemed to care an awful lot about constitutional norms and separation of powers principles. Intellectual hypocrisy again.
Specifically, Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s House of Representatives debated whether to Congressionally impose War Powers Resolution limitations upon President Trump’s unilateral ability to ratchet up militancy actions with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In their crusade to hamstring the president’s conduct of his foreign policy vis-à-vis the Iranian regime, House Democrats even found several libertarian-leaning Republican allies.
In my opinion this exercise was misguided, because the War Powers Resolution is, and always has been, unconstitutional. It has never been challenged in the courts. This most recent effort was really an attempt by the Democrats to embarrass the president.
The Constitution divides foreign affairs powers between the legislative and executive branches. Among other enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8, Congress has the ability to “declare War,” “raise and support Armies,” “provide and maintain a Navy,” “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” “provide for calling forth the Militia,” and “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia.”
On the other hand, Article II of the Constitution provides that “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.” The very first clause of Article II also vests the president with “[t]he executive Power” — meaning a “residual” foreign affairs power that encompasses all those powers not expressly delegated to Congress in Article I, Section 8.
Many legal scholars have conducted a careful, line-by-line overview of Congress’s enumerated powers and have concluded that the constitution does not provide a legislative means that could feasibly justify the War Powers Resolution. The most likely candidate is the Declare War Clause, but that provision happens to be woefully misunderstood by many lawyers and politicians across the ideological spectrum.
Congress can intervene to halt a president if it views a reckless warmonger is using the manifold tools it has at its disposal:
- Decreasing the size of the Pentagon’s budget by going line item-by-line item and removing various offensive-oriented materiel from the Department of Defense’s arsenal, or using its more general power of the purse to defund a war effort in its entirety
- This was what eventually happened in the Vietnam War case.
This interpretation of the Declare War Clause should not be nearly as controversial as it is. At the 1787 constitutional convention, the Framers actually conscientiously substituted out “make War” with “declare War.” In so doing, James Madison explained that it was imperative to leave to the president the “power to repel sudden attacks.” This ought to make a great deal of sense; as Alexander Hamilton would explain only six months after the constitutional convention in The Federalist No. 70, “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number.”
Finally, in Article I, Section 10, the Constitution precludes a state from “engag[ing] in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” The Framers were therefore aware of multiple verbs — “make” and “engage” — that could have clearly conveyed the meaning of an initiation of hostilities. But they didn’t use those words, and they didn’t use them for a reason. The Framers understood that there was great merit to leaving decisions such as the commencement of hostilities to one man, and not to a fractious Congress.
Congress already has a number of tools at its disposal to push back against a crusading commander-in-chief. As Andrew McCarthy wrote this week at Fox News, “No statute is needed to provide Congress with the power to frustrate unauthorized presidential war-making. The Constitution empowers the legislature to do so by simply refusing to appropriate funds for military action.” But the Declare War Clause means something fundamentally different than what many believe it does.
No president, to date, has abided by the war powers act! Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Libya being cases in point. They have avoided a legal show down by advising Congress after the fact of military action. President Obama in 2016 wrote: “I am providing this supplemental consolidated report, prepared by my Administration and consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), as part of my efforts to keep the Congress informed about deployments of U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat.” The term “consistent with” has been used by multiple presidents. They were saying that their notification was not “as required” by the resolution, but “consistent with” it.. This wording was used to avoid a legal challenge to the requirements for notification of Congress for fear of the president losing to a liberal judiciary and thus a resulting limitation on presidential power.
The debate over the war powers of the Congress versus the President will continue and in most cases it will be highlighted when a house of Congress is controlled by a political party that does not control the White House. This is what we have just observed.
The strategic question is highlighted by the preemptive attack versus defensive reaction. If the War Powers goal of the House Democrats was to take away the president’s ability to preempt an Iranian attack it is both a strategic mistake and inconsistent with the war powers resolution. This is precisely what the Democrats sought: The resolution “requires the president to consult with Congress in every possible instanced before introducing United States Armed Forces in hostilities.” As a perceived new limitation on the ability of the president to use the military to protect US interests it would be tantamount to strategic surrender to the Iranians by denying the president multiple strategic options. This action thus must surely be nothing more than the Democrats expressing their angst against a successful presidential action.
The debate over war powers will most likely continue and will most likely never been finalized because the extreme answers available are strategic mistakes and such is realized by most clear thinking personnel.
Bruce B.G. Clarke 