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INF Treaty Update

The Army is looking at extending the range of its Precision Strike Missile to 800 KM.  This come following the dissolution of the INF Treaty which had limited ground based missile ranges to 500 KM.  The Army’s Precision Fires Cross-functional team will ill conduct its first flight tests from two competitor companies before the end of the year.  After the tests the Army will talk to the competitors about pursuing the extended ranges.

Media Excursion

The announcement that the US would re-position some of its 1000 troops in Syria to avoid their being engaged by Turkish soldiers if they invade has created another firestorm in the media.

Now that the Turks have started their attack there are numerous reports flying around:

  • Civilian targets are being attacked
  • The Kurds have requested that the US impose and enforce a “no fly zone.”
  • The Senate is considering severe sanctions against Turkey

The media and even some Republicans fear is that Kurdish fighters may be attacked by Turkish armed forces moving into north-eastern Syria.  In essence the media and other pundits are saying that the lives of US soldiers should remain at risk in order to protect the Kurds.

Hidden in all of this punditry are several hard facts:

  • The Kurds, with US support are holding 11,000 ISIS prisoners. An attack on the Kurds would possibly result in their freedom.
  • There are only about 50 Special Forces that are being tactically relocated.
  • The US has always wanted the US presence in Syria to be a short term operation
  • Now that the Turks have invaded their stated goal is to create a free zone in Syria so that many of the refugees that are in Turkey can be relocated to this safe zone
  • There is no indication that the Russians in Syria will get caught up in engaging the Turks—if that should happen it could trip the NATO obligations of other states to come to the assistance of an attacked ally. There are even reports that the Russians were trying to negotiate some form of cease fire.

What I seem to have missed in the reporting is why the Turks chose to attack into Syria now.  Probably missed because there are so many possible explanations:

  • Expansion of Turkey’s geographic area of control
  • Resettlement of Syrian refugees
  • Further destabilizing Assad of Syria
  • Weakening/destroying the Kurds

None of these explain the current timing.  Could the real reason be because Erdogan is in trouble politically?  The above objectives could all be valid but the domestic political situation is responsible for the present timing.

If the Turks don’t attack the Kurds and their US Special Forces advisors there will be no problem.  The US will have reduced its footprint in Syria and be on the way out, leaving the resolution of the conflict to regional actors with the Kurds secure in an enclave away  from the Turkish border.

So when you cut everything away the media frenzy is about US credibility in supporting allies in the future.  This assumes that the Kurds are being deserted by their Special Forces advisor / assistants and especially that their logistical support and air support will be shut off.  It is difficult to see that happening if for no other reason than the 11,000 ISIS prisoners that they hold.

In a perfect world the Kurds and Turks could coexist and the Syrian refugees could be relocated from Turkey into this safe zone.  Such a coexistence would be a very fragile one.

Strategically, there is still something missing from the above discussion.  We will watch the situation and update it as appropriate in the future.

We’ll see what happens.

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The Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty

Preamble:  While I was on my hiatus the United States and Russia abrogated the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty.  This is a treaty that I was involved in negotiating so I provide some insights today.

In1987 INF Treaty was agreed to between the US and the Soviet Union.  The negotiations had their genesis in the NATO Dual Track Decision of 1979. In December 1979, the United States and its NATO allies adopted a long-term strategy to remove the threat posed by new Soviet intermediate-range missiles.

The Dual Track Decision was built on “two parallel and complementary approaches.” First, the United States agreed to deploy intermediate-range missiles of its own to Europe. European nations—Germany, Italy, the UK and Belgium agreed to have either ground-based long range cruise missiles or modernized Pershing missiles—Pershing IIs (PIIs)– stationed on their territory.  Second, it would leverage these new missiles in an arms control negotiation with Moscow with the aim of convincing the Soviets to dismantle their weapons. The negotiations both within the US government and those with our NATO allies were extremely divisive.

In fact, as a participant in the intra-governmental activities I can attest to the issues involved.  One short vignette might make the point.  In 1979 the US and NATO were involved in the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations where the allies were seeking to reduce Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe.  Part of the offer from NATO included the removal of nuclear capable Pershing I (PIs) missiles for a Soviet Tank Army.  The Army Staff had been unsuccessful in convincing the Carter Administration that it was impossible to negotiate away Pershing Is (PIs) in MBFR and PIIs in the INF negotiations that were to be.  Finally we took a model of a PI and a bag of parts over to the State Department.  We tore the PI model apart and then using the bag of parts we build a model of a PII.  Finally the light came on in Foggy Bottom.

Within Europe there were numerous anti-nuclear demonstrations.  It was necessary to have multiple nations basing the new systems to insure that alliance resolve was maintained.

After 8 years of negotiations the resulting treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The treaty marked the first time the superpowers had agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons, and employ extensive on-site inspections for verification. As a result of the INF Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union destroyed a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by the treaty’s implementation deadline of June 1, 1991.

Like all arms control agreements between the US and the Soviet Union there were continual claims of treaty violations by both sides. The United States first alleged in its July 2014 Annual Compliance Report to Congress that Russia was in violation of its INF Treaty obligations “not to possess, produce, or flight-test” a ground-launched cruise missile having a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers or “to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.” Subsequent State Department assessments in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 repeated these allegations. In March 2017, a top US official confirmed press reports that Russia had begun deploying the noncompliant missile. Russia has denied that it is in violation of the agreement and has accused the United States of being in noncompliance.

In December 2017 the Trump administration released an integrated strategy to counter alleged Russian violations of the treaty, including the commencement of research and development on a conventional, road-mobile, intermediate-range missile system. In October 2018, President Trump announced his intention to “terminate” the INF Treaty, citing Russian noncompliance and concerns about China’s intermediate-range missile arsenal. Then in December, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the United States found Russia in “material breach” of the treaty and would suspend its treaty obligations in 60 days if Russia did not return to compliance in that time. In February the Trump administration declared a suspension of US obligations under the INF Treaty and formally announced its intention to withdraw from the treaty in six months. Shortly thereafter, Russian President Vladimir Putin also announced that Russia will be officially suspending its treaty obligations as well.

Last August the United States formally withdrew from the INF Treaty.

The formal stated reason for withdrawal from the Treaty may have been Russian Non-Compliance, however in the second Obama Administration the US began its tilt away from the major threat being in Europe towards concern about the Chinese threat in the Pacific.  One of the problems with defense in the region was that the US was prohibited from basing ground based intermediate nuclear forces on the littorals of China because they could range into Russia.  Many work arounds were considered such as basing cruise missiles on barges—hence technically not ground based.  Elimination of the treaty has solved this problem.

The US Army has been working on developing the hardware that would have the Army fighting a long range defense of islands in the Pacific without significant naval support.  Strange task organizations of limited maneuver forces, but layered air/missile defense and engagement means out to 500 miles to engage a hostile naval force and attrite it without naval or air support have been looked at.  If I were a sceptic I would suggest that this is the Army seeking to remain relevant in the Pacific Theater.

The Russians’ paranoia about being invaded from the expanded NATO (its Eastern European buffer seized after World War II is gone) is the reason for the basing of longer range nuclear forces in Eastern European Russia.  The Russians perceive a strategic need to base intermediate range nuclear forces in the old treaty area to be able to deter the much expanded NATO.  Can there be a new INF Treaty?  Will the international dynamics be such as to create a win-win situation for the two sides?

The response to the Iranian attacks on Saudi oil facilities

Preamble:  We have taken a sabbatical from writing articles for the last 18 months in response to the venom that is out there in the media.  However, the US response to the Iranian attacks seems to indicate a completely new US approach to global stability.  Therefore I felt duty bound to spell out my thoughts and respond to those who can only see their hate of this administration.

The recent Iranian attacks on the Saudi oil facilities in north eastern Saudi Arabia indicate an escalation by the Iranians.  Why?  Do the Iranians perceive that the US is powerless because of the Democratic calls for impeachment?  Are the sanctions and limits on Iranian oil exports taking such a toll that the Iranians feel that the world will react to Saudi oil output short falls and try to force the US to relax its containment of Iran?

The lack of an American kinetic response has the world wondering what has changed in the US approach to the world.  By listening to the president’s speech at the UN yesterday it is now very clear that the President does not see the US as the world’s policeman.   In the name of regional stability the US is deploying defensive capabilities to Saudi Arabia.

The recent attacks show the deficiencies of the Saudi military.  In spite of extensive expenditures their missile defense capabilities are still inadequate in the face of Iranian cruise missiles.  Reports indicate that the problems are both the training of the force and the needs of a modern missile defense.

Missile defense requires the ability to intercept multiple types of missiles through a complex spectrum of missile types.  Most missile defense systems can be overcome by a volume of missiles.  The Israeli “Iron Dome” system attempts to discriminate based on a calculation of impact points.  Will incoming missiles hit critical assets?  The Saudi system has not reached the degree of sophistication required to make such a discrimination automatically.

The lack of a kinetic attack illustrates the new Trump Doctrine—allies must protect themselves and respond to attacks using their own capabilities.  The US will assist where necessary to maintain stability until the allies have developed their own capabilities.  This approach means that the Saudis and the Gulf Cooperative Council members should respond to threats.  The US may provide technical assistance in such a response, but one should not expect US forces attacking Iran unless US forces have been directly engaged by Iranians.

The military situation in the Gulf is truly asymmetric, but in a different way than the discussion of conventional forces versus terrorists or unconventional forces.  The Iranians have devoted a significant part of their defense development to offensive missiles and small attack boats, while the Gulf States have focused on air power and defensive forces.  As noted above the Iranian missile assets can most likely overpower the defenses of the Gulf States.  However, a series of preemptive attacks might go a long way in leveling the battle field.  One could even envision the Apache attack helicopters that the Saudis have being able to go in under the Iranian radar and doing extensive damage.

Will the Saudis/Gulf States respond?  The answer to this question is probably in the Iranian hands.  If they push the opportunity that they may perceive exists because of the political situation in the US they may in fact cause a reaction with extensive US support.  On the other hand if the new status quo continues nothing may happen. The status quo favors the Saudis and the Gulf States as the political situation in Iran may continue to deteriorate and they can enhance their defensive and offensive capabilities.

Offensive cyber authorization

Reports indicate that new legislation in the Senate proposes to authorize US military cyber warriors to go on the offensive against Russian attacks on the United States in cyberspace.   It also mandates a cyber deterrence doctrine.

These same reports indicate that lawmakers were disappointed in the administration’s latest cyber policy. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s fiscal year 2019 defense policy bill designates clandestine military operations in cyberspace as “traditional military activities.”  This affirms the secretary of defense’s ability to order cyber operations. A related section of the bill “authorizes the National Command Authority to direct US Cyber Command to take appropriate and proportional action through cyberspace to disrupt, defeat and deter systematic and ongoing attacks by Russia in cyberspace,” the report states:

(a) In General.—It shall be the policy of the United States, with respect to matters pertaining to cyberspace, cybersecurity, and cyber warfare, that the United States should employ all instruments of national power, including the use of offensive cyber capabilities, to deter if possible, and respond when necessary, to any and all cyber-attacks or other malicious cyber activities that target United States interests with the intent to—

(1) cause casualties among United States persons or persons of our allies;

(2) significantly disrupt the normal functioning of United States democratic society or government (including attacks against critical infrastructure that could damage systems used to provide key services to the public or government);

(3) threaten the command and control of the United States Armed Forces, the freedom of maneuver of the United States Armed Forces, or the industrial base or other infrastructure on which the United States Armed Forces rely to defend United States interests and commitments; or

(4) achieve an effect, whether individually or in aggregate, comparable to an armed attack or imperil a vital interest of the United States.”

There are several interesting aspects to this Congressional proposed strategic policy.

1.    The concept of cyber deterrence as a doctrine.

2.    That deterrence of cyber-attacks may also be achieved by the use of non-cyber responses.

The congress determining national security strategy is by itself unique.  The formal authorization of a cyber deterrence doctrine opens the whole realm of what is deterrence?

My UCLA graduate school professor (Bernard Brodie who was one of the founders of deterrence doctrine thought of deterrence as” a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires. A credible nuclear deterrent,  he wrote, must be always at the ready, yet never used.”

Subsequently the capacity to harm another state was to be a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state’s behavior. To be coercive or deter another state, violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation.

Deterrence is considered to consist of the capability to inflict such harm and the willingness to do so.  Capability is the more easily demonstrated aspect of deterrence.  It is achieved through observable tests, news reports or use. Willingness is the hard part to quantify.  It is usually thought to consist of demonstrated use or as during the cold war some form of automaticity to the response.  With the consequences of a major nuclear exchange being so great during the cold war and automatic responses discussed openly no side was willing to test the willingness of the other.

This lack of willingness to test the other side’s willingness became the source of moderation during the cold war.  Simple escalation of the DEFCON or making advanced alert status visible was used as a method of signaling willingness.

How one is to signal willingness in the cyber world is a fascinating question.  It may require some cyber ‘skirmishes.”  Possibly these have already occurred.

As we go forward in the evolution of strategic thought the concept of cyber deterrence will require significant additional study and the response to questions, such as:

  • What is the potential damage?
  • What is the nature of escalatory steps?
  • What are the defensive measures?  (These will most likely be constantly changing.)

This article should open a dialogue of cyber deterrence.  Please make your comments and check back for the comments of others.

Update: The Korea -US summit–the process continues

For the last 2 weeks the North Koreans and the US have been playing many “cards” in their efforts to have the upper hand in Singapore.  Let’s review the high points.

  • The North Koreans walk out of a meeting with the ‘south Koreans and issue a searing critique of National Security advisor Bolton. The critique was against him personally, but more importantly the North Koreans were rebelling at the Libyan example—Kaddafi denuclearized and then 15 years or so he was overthrown by rebels armed and provided air support by NATO and then subsequently murdered.  Not a good image to send the North Koreans.
  • The North Koreans also slowed discussions about the summit.
  • President Trump talked less positively about the probability of the summit and mentions the military option.
  • The president send us a letter to Kim Jun Un that was very conciliatory and positive but cancelled the summit.
  • However the President continues with a scheduled meeting with President Moon of South Korea. The two president talked about trade but one can be sure that they were seeking to show solidarity and soften the rhetoric.
  • Today President Moon and Kim Jun meet in for 2 hours in Panmunjom and talked about the relations between the two Koreas. Some pundits of course argue that they can have a summit and don’t need President Trump probably because they don’t understand the “process”
  • Sarah Sanders announced that the US advance team departs for Singapore tomorrow to prepare for the summit.
  • Positive remarks are heard around Washington to include from the President
  • There may be several more back and forths but unless the North Koreans play a strong antagonistic card one can expect a reversal of the cancellation this coming week.

The search for an advantage will continue by both sides but it looks like there will be a summit.

Strong demands –who are they aimed at?

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Monday that the Trump administration will embark on an “unprecedented” pressure campaign against Iran meant to fundamentally change its foreign policy. Delivering his first major foreign policy address as top diplomat at the Heritage Foundation, a Washington think tank, Pompeo listed 12 sweeping and uncompromising conditions for a new nuclear deal with Tehran after President Donald Trump withdrew from an existing one earlier this month.

Pompeo said that the JCPOA put the world at risk because of its fatal flaws. Therefore the list of US demands is long” because Iran’s activities are bold in scope, “We didn’t create the list – they did.” There were reported to be twelve demands, but a thorough reading of his speech makes it 15:  (the number doesn’t matter the message does)

  1. We will apply unprecedented financial pressure on the Iranian regime. The leaders in Tehran will have no doubt about our seriousness. The departments of Treasury and Commerce are already working on the sanctions.
  2. I will work closely with the Department of Defense and our regional allies to deter Iranian aggression.
  3. We will ensure freedom of navigation on the waters in the region. We will work to prevent and counteract any Iranian malign cyber activity. We will track down Iranian operatives and their Hezbollah proxies operating around the world and we will crush them. Iran will never again have carte blanche to dominate the Middle East.
  4. We will also advocate tirelessly for the Iranian people. The regime must improve how it treats its citizens. It must protect the human rights of every Iranian. It must cease wasting Iran’s wealth abroad. We ask that our international partners continue to add their voice to ours in condemning Iran’s treatment of its own citizens.
  5. Iran must declare to the IAEA a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear program, and permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity.
  6. Iran must stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing. This includes closing its heavy water reactor.
  7. Iran must also provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all nuclear sites throughout the entire country.
  8. Iran must end its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launching or development of nuclear-capable missile systems.
  9. Iran must release all U.S. citizens, as well as citizens of our partners and allies, each of them detained on spurious charges.
  10. Iran must end support to Middle East terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
  11. Iran must respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi Government and permit the disarming, demobilization, and reintegration of Shia militias.
  12. Iran must also end its military support for the Houthi militia and work towards a peaceful political settlement in Yemen.
  13. Iran must withdraw all forces under Iranian command throughout the entirety of Syria.
  14. Iran must end support for the Taliban and other terrorists in Afghanistan and the region, and cease harboring senior al-Qaida leaders.

These demands are broad in scope and in essence call for the end of Iran’s goal as to the creation of a caliphate across the Middle East from Egypt to Afghanistan.  There are some wide ranging and probably on their face impossible to achieve.  The center of gravity of his remarks appears to be a call for regime change. He said that we ask the Iranian people: Is this what you want your country to be known for, for being a co-conspirator with Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al-Qaida? The United States believe you deserve better.

With a regime change all of the other goals become more possible.

With a regime change all of the other goals become more possible.When one sees this hard line approach to Iran (North Korea’s partner or client in weapons building) he must wonder how Kim Jun Un he sees the on again of again upcoming summit.  Kim responded negatively to President Trump’s Libya analogy, with cause.  Things went well for Libya for about 10 years before the revolution stared and was supported by NATO with arms and air support until the government was overthrown and Qaddafi killed.

In this complex world such examples provide the wrong message to both the Iranians and the North Koreans.

As things progress in the processes that have been started with North Korea and Iran we will watch them with interest and report on them when needed and appropriate.