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How the War in Ukraine May End
A year ago, I argued that the war in Ukraine had reached a strategic stalemate. Today I believe that stalemate is beginning to break—not because either side has achieved a decisive battlefield breakthrough, but because Ukraine is increasingly attacking the political and economic foundations that allow Russia to continue fighting. If this assessment is correct, the decisive battles of the war may ultimately be fought not only on the front lines but also within Russia’s economy and political system.
Russia’s battlefield strategy continues to impose enormous costs while producing only limited military gains. Despite heavy casualties, Russian forces have not fundamentally altered their reliance on mass infantry assaults reminiscent of earlier eras of warfare. Such tactics have become increasingly costly. The battlefield is now under near-continuous surveillance by drones, allowing Ukrainian forces to direct artillery and precision strikes against attacking formations before they can achieve meaningful maneuver. Russia continues to capture small amounts of territory, but only at a disproportionate cost in personnel and equipment.
Estimates of Russian casualties vary, but there is broad agreement that Russia has suffered exceptionally heavy losses in personnel, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery systems, and other military equipment while making only incremental territorial gains. The exact numbers matter less than the overall trend: Russia continues to expend manpower and matériel at a rate that appears difficult to sustain indefinitely.
Ukraine appears to have concluded that battlefield attrition alone is unlikely to end the war. Instead, it has expanded attacks deep inside Russia against oil refineries, fuel storage facilities, transportation networks, and other critical infrastructure. In military theory, these assets form part of a nation’s “center of gravity”—the economic and industrial foundations that enable military operations. Refineries not only supply fuel for military forces but also generate export revenues that finance the Russian state.
These attacks appear to be imposing increasing economic costs. Reports that Russia has imported gasoline refined in India from Russian crude oil illustrate the growing disruption to its domestic refining capacity. The longer refineries, ports, and other critical infrastructure remain damaged, the greater the economic burden of sustaining the war. Rebuilding these facilities requires time, skilled labor, and resources that cannot simultaneously support military operations.
The campaign against Russia’s economic infrastructure is complemented by Ukraine’s effort to isolate Crimea. Ukrainian strikes have increasingly targeted the bridges, ports, airfields, and logistical routes that connect the peninsula to mainland Russia. Even if Crimea is not immediately retaken, making it progressively more difficult to reinforce and supply raises both the military and psychological costs of maintaining Russia’s occupation. Losing Crimea, which Russia has controlled since 2014, would represent a significant symbolic and political setback for the Kremlin.
At the same time, Russia’s wartime economy presents a paradox. Military production has generated employment and stimulated sectors of the economy that had previously struggled. While war has become economically burdensome, ending it could also create severe dislocations as factories, workers, and government finances attempt to transition back to a peacetime economy. For the Russian leadership, managing such a transition could prove almost as difficult as continuing the war itself.
Even if Ukraine succeeds in increasing Russia’s military and economic costs, another question remains: what would persuade the Kremlin to stop fighting? Military losses alone rarely end wars when political leaders believe defeat threatens their own survival. That appears increasingly relevant in Russia. If Vladimir Putin and those around him believe that losing the war could result in imprisonment, exile, or even death, then the normal cost-benefit calculation changes. Preserving the regime becomes more important than preserving military forces.
This suggests that the true center of gravity may extend beyond Russia’s economy to the cohesion of its governing elite. Authoritarian systems often depend upon a relatively small group of trusted political, military, and security leaders. If that leadership becomes increasingly divided, isolated, or unable to replace experienced officials, the government’s capacity to continue the war may weaken even if substantial military forces remain in the field. Political instability, elite defections, or internal power struggles may ultimately prove more decisive than battlefield victories alone.
A similar dynamic may be observed elsewhere. Recent events involving Iran suggest that authoritarian governments can often replace senior leaders quickly unless disruption extends well beyond the highest levels of command. Removing a few senior officials rarely changes policy if an experienced leadership structure remains intact. Lasting political change generally requires weakening the institutions and networks that sustain the regime.
If this analysis is correct, the decisive struggle in Ukraine is no longer simply for villages, trenches, or even territory. It is increasingly a contest over whether Russia’s political leadership can continue to govern, finance the war, and maintain the loyalty of those around it. Military operations remain essential, but they increasingly serve the larger objective of undermining Russia’s capacity to sustain the conflict. Should those political and economic foundations weaken sufficiently, the war may ultimately end not with a dramatic military collapse but with political change in Moscow.
Learning from the corona virus
While the media spasms[i] over the corona virus as a way to get rid of President Trump, we should be examining critical lessons that we should learn with respect to military preparedness.
The corona virus (Covid-19) outbreak is causing some disruptions in military productions and activities. Right now these are precautionary. The bigger issue that these disruptions highlight is the issue of single source procurement. Will external sources being interrupted result in more producers returning to the US? Are self-imposed risks acceptable?
Some of the disruptions in military activities include:
- Lockheed Martin has held up production of F-35s in Italy and Japan. They have told employees to stay home for the next week. However, Lt Gen Fick (Program Manager) said that he does not anticipate any other disruption to the supply chain and that the Joint Program Office (JPO) is not taking any deliberate steps to actively curtail any ripple effects due to the corona virus that may further go through the F-35 supply chain.
- The Indian Navy (IN) has postponed the 10-day long ‘Milan 2020’ multilateral exercise it was expected to host in the Bay of Bengal for 31 navies. The IN said in a statement on 3 March that this year’s iteration of the biennial exercise, which was scheduled to begin on 18 March, has been deferred after taking “the safety of all participants and travel restrictions imposed by the spread of Covid-19”
- The Pentagon will decide soon how to prepare for the upcoming military moving season with the outbreak based on whether the new COVID-19 virus is still active in late spring through early fall, a military doctor said Wednesday. Presently travel to and from Korea is halted.
- Military families in Italy are facing a third week of school and day care closures. They are also facing a two week quarantine when/if they return to the US.
- The Army is screening new recruits before they enter basic training. Any found positive for COVID-19 will be quarantined.
It is certain that these are only the tip of the iceberg. What is most important is what are we learning from the ongoing disruptions? Are we examining supply chains to see where we have potential bottlenecks? Are corporations and government entities willing to pay the price for some redundancy or are they going to take a risk? Risk might be acceptable in some categories or cases but not others. Examples where risk may not be acceptable include pharmaceuticals, long lead time parts and components for essential military equipment, critical personnel skills.
The obvious other casualty of this virus scare is globalism. When critical things have been allowed or even encouraged to be externally produced and then become unavailable due to disruptions in production and thus the supply chain in addition to looking for alternate production providers we might just question the whole philosophy that caused the problem—globalism.
A peacetime example that could occur next week to military units because of personnel replacement disruptions. As an armored brigade commander I had over 100 tanks to maintain. In my direct support maintenance unit there was only an authorization for 2 turret mechanics with a critical skill. If one of those authorizations was not filled and the other individual was on special duty my turret problems went unresolved until I could find a work around. So an efficiency in personnel created a maintenance bottleneck and reduced readiness of several tanks. Was this an acceptable risk? Not to me but surely to the bean counters in the Pentagon. Surely they considered the risk. But what if the bottleneck is not anticipated or there is not a work around. This example applies as much to the supply chain as it does to personnel. Is there a workaround whether it be alternate suppliers or backup capabilities? Redundancy is not necessarily bad.
These are the questions that we should be answering. We should thank the Covid-19 for forcing the consideration of the risks created by what were thought to be the efficiencies of single source and function operations and globalism.
[i] “Unfortunately, we have been able to assess that accounts tied to Russia, the entire ecosystem of Russian disinformation, has been engaged in the midst of this world health crisis,” Lea Gabrielle, head of the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, testified before the Senate on Thursday.
She went on: “We saw the entire ecosystem of Russian disinformation at play. Russian state proxy websites, official state media, as well as swarms of online, false personas pushing out false narratives.”
The Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty
Preamble: While I was on my hiatus the United States and Russia abrogated the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty. This is a treaty that I was involved in negotiating so I provide some insights today.
In1987 INF Treaty was agreed to between the US and the Soviet Union. The negotiations had their genesis in the NATO Dual Track Decision of 1979. In December 1979, the United States and its NATO allies adopted a long-term strategy to remove the threat posed by new Soviet intermediate-range missiles.
The Dual Track Decision was built on “two parallel and complementary approaches.” First, the United States agreed to deploy intermediate-range missiles of its own to Europe. European nations—Germany, Italy, the UK and Belgium agreed to have either ground-based long range cruise missiles or modernized Pershing missiles—Pershing IIs (PIIs)– stationed on their territory. Second, it would leverage these new missiles in an arms control negotiation with Moscow with the aim of convincing the Soviets to dismantle their weapons. The negotiations both within the US government and those with our NATO allies were extremely divisive.
In fact, as a participant in the intra-governmental activities I can attest to the issues involved. One short vignette might make the point. In 1979 the US and NATO were involved in the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations where the allies were seeking to reduce Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe. Part of the offer from NATO included the removal of nuclear capable Pershing I (PIs) missiles for a Soviet Tank Army. The Army Staff had been unsuccessful in convincing the Carter Administration that it was impossible to negotiate away Pershing Is (PIs) in MBFR and PIIs in the INF negotiations that were to be. Finally we took a model of a PI and a bag of parts over to the State Department. We tore the PI model apart and then using the bag of parts we build a model of a PII. Finally the light came on in Foggy Bottom.
Within Europe there were numerous anti-nuclear demonstrations. It was necessary to have multiple nations basing the new systems to insure that alliance resolve was maintained.
After 8 years of negotiations the resulting treaty required the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The treaty marked the first time the superpowers had agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons, and employ extensive on-site inspections for verification. As a result of the INF Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union destroyed a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by the treaty’s implementation deadline of June 1, 1991.
Like all arms control agreements between the US and the Soviet Union there were continual claims of treaty violations by both sides. The United States first alleged in its July 2014 Annual Compliance Report to Congress that Russia was in violation of its INF Treaty obligations “not to possess, produce, or flight-test” a ground-launched cruise missile having a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers or “to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.” Subsequent State Department assessments in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 repeated these allegations. In March 2017, a top US official confirmed press reports that Russia had begun deploying the noncompliant missile. Russia has denied that it is in violation of the agreement and has accused the United States of being in noncompliance.
In December 2017 the Trump administration released an integrated strategy to counter alleged Russian violations of the treaty, including the commencement of research and development on a conventional, road-mobile, intermediate-range missile system. In October 2018, President Trump announced his intention to “terminate” the INF Treaty, citing Russian noncompliance and concerns about China’s intermediate-range missile arsenal. Then in December, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the United States found Russia in “material breach” of the treaty and would suspend its treaty obligations in 60 days if Russia did not return to compliance in that time. In February the Trump administration declared a suspension of US obligations under the INF Treaty and formally announced its intention to withdraw from the treaty in six months. Shortly thereafter, Russian President Vladimir Putin also announced that Russia will be officially suspending its treaty obligations as well.
Last August the United States formally withdrew from the INF Treaty.
The formal stated reason for withdrawal from the Treaty may have been Russian Non-Compliance, however in the second Obama Administration the US began its tilt away from the major threat being in Europe towards concern about the Chinese threat in the Pacific. One of the problems with defense in the region was that the US was prohibited from basing ground based intermediate nuclear forces on the littorals of China because they could range into Russia. Many work arounds were considered such as basing cruise missiles on barges—hence technically not ground based. Elimination of the treaty has solved this problem.
The US Army has been working on developing the hardware that would have the Army fighting a long range defense of islands in the Pacific without significant naval support. Strange task organizations of limited maneuver forces, but layered air/missile defense and engagement means out to 500 miles to engage a hostile naval force and attrite it without naval or air support have been looked at. If I were a sceptic I would suggest that this is the Army seeking to remain relevant in the Pacific Theater.
The Russians’ paranoia about being invaded from the expanded NATO (its Eastern European buffer seized after World War II is gone) is the reason for the basing of longer range nuclear forces in Eastern European Russia. The Russians perceive a strategic need to base intermediate range nuclear forces in the old treaty area to be able to deter the much expanded NATO. Can there be a new INF Treaty? Will the international dynamics be such as to create a win-win situation for the two sides?
Is a new cold war on the horizon?
I have recently been reading the Dagger Brigade posts (2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, which the author once commanded) as it moves around Eastern Europe training with allies as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve—a program to demonstrate NATO resolve to deter the Russians for dramatic attacks and conquest of its previous kingdom (satellite countries).
Atlantic Resolve and other NATO activities in Eastern Europe and the pledged increase in force capabilities seem to assume a conventional force attack by the Russians. This approach is called into question by current Russian activities.
Russia is aggressively building up its nuclear forces and is expected to deploy a total force of 8,000 warheads by 2026 along while modernizing its deep underground bunkers, according to reports citing Pentagon officials.
The Russian force build up implies several aspects of its view of future warfare. The 8,000 warheads will include both large strategic warheads and thousands of new low-yield and very low-yield warheads. These will circumvent arms treaty limits. Russia’s new doctrine is one of using nuclear arms early in any conflict.
This new doctrine as it evolves seems to combine the use of low and very low yield nuclear weapons in conjunction with attacks by tactical ground forces. Simultaneous it seeks to maintain strategic deterrence by having a modernized mobile strategic arsenal. The mobility of the strategic forces enhances their survivability. Part of this deterrence effort includes fortification of underground facilities for command and control during such a nuclear conflict.
The United States and NATO are watching this alarming expansion as to determine if Russia is preparing to break out of current nuclear forces constraints under arms treaties, including the 2010 New START and 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties. Russia has already violated the INF accord by testing an illegal ground-launched cruise missile.
This Russian nuclear arms buildup is among the activities being studied by the ongoing Pentagon major review of US nuclear forces called the Nuclear Posture Review. The conclusions of the review are expected to be disclosed early next year—possibly coinciding with state of the union address by the president: He is on the record as saying: “I want modernization and rehabilitation… It’s got to be in tip top shape,”
The current posture review reverses the views of the Obama administration which called for reducing the role of nuclear weapons and the size of the arsenal. The cut back in nuclear forces by Obama was based on assessments—now considered false by many officials—that nuclear threats posed by Russia and other states had been lowered significantly, and that Moscow and Washington were no longer considered enemies.
The Obama administration based its strategic nuclear deterrence and warfare policies on the incorrect and outdated assumption that the prospects of US.-Russia military confrontation had been reduced sharply. However many have noted that since 2010 Russia, China, and North Korea have been engaged in steadily building up their forces with new nuclear arms and delivery systems, while Iran remains an outlier that many experts believe will eventually decide to build a nuclear arsenal. The Obama administration did not react to this changing strategic situation.
The Pentagon’s new posture review is based in part on a reversal of the outdated Obama-era assessment. Most likely it will include:
- Recognition of an increased global nuclear threat
- Recommendations on increasing the US nuclear force modernization—warheads and delivery vehicles
- A recommendation to revise US and NATO warfighting doctrine, tactics and techniques.
To many this may result in a modernized version of the Reagan era capability gap and a cry for almost drastic efforts to close the gap. This will be a major fight for resources that President Trump could lose based upon liberal intransigence and an unwillingness to accept the threat. Will the US and NATO react in time and with appropriate responses?
Is NATO’s Atlantic Resolve soon to be an inappropriate activity when the Russian nuclear threat is considered? OR can it or should it be modified to include the artillery battalion in the deployed brigade combat teams (BCTs) have nuclear warheads available? Should the deployed artillery battalions train for the conduct of nuclear operations? Should the ground forces train for operations in a nuclear environment? Should additional nuclear capable systems be deployed with the BCTs? These are all questions that NATO and the US need to consider as the efforts to deter Russian aggression continue.
Is the cold war returning?
Bruce B.G. Clarke 