In coming days/weeks we will again post an entire series of articles on the events leading up to the siege of the Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB). If one sews these articles together, he will have much of the story leading up to the siege. This introduction provides a road map for those who want to catch up on what happened 54 years ago January 21, 1968. I am a little late this year posting these articles. I will also update them, as appropriate.
I post these articles so that readers can appreciate the gallantry of the Bru Montagnards, the Vietnamese soldiers, the Marines of CAC O, the other members of Advisory Team 4, CPT War Britt the FAC and all of the others that were involved in the village fight specifically, but also those soldiers, airmen and Marines who were all involved in the Battle of Khe Sanh.
Was America Duped at Khe Sanh—debunks an article in the New York Times about North Vietnamese strategy leading up to Khe Sanh
General Westmoreland and the Vietnam War Strategy—continues the discussion of the false items in the previously mentioned New York Times article. It presents the dueling strategies of the two sides.
Limited War and Rules of Engagement—presents a discussion of the problems with limited war concepts and how they related to Rules of Engagement.
Khe Sanh—the intelligence build up—explains the origins of the title Expendable Warriors.
Command and Control in the Khe Sanh Area of Operations (AO)—explains the quagmire that was the local command and control situation. Lack of unity of command lead to a lack of unity of effort.
The march towards the opening of the siege of the Khe Sanh Combat Base—explains the North Vietnamese Army approach towards the village of Khe Sanh.
1968 Advisory Team 4 Newsletter—how the battle around the village was originally explained in a newsletter published by Advisory Team 4 headquarters in Quang Tri.
The village fight 2—further explains what happened during the defense of the District Headquarters
Air Support for Khe Sanh Village—explains the various forms of air support that were used to support the defenders of the District Headquarters and how they were coordinated for.
The Battle of Khe Sanh Village is Over—the Advisory Team the district forces withdraw after the Marines are withdrawn and further artillery support is denied.
The previous edition of each of these articles can be found on https://brucebgclarke.com/
I was a battery commander with the 5/22 FA, 175 mm guns, at Ahn Khe/Camp Radcliffe, with the 1CAV late November 1967. We were NOT aware of the upcoming NVA/Vietnam Cong Tet Offensive the end of January 1968 throughout South Vietnam. Most of the Camp Radcliffe enemy action was directed at the 1CAV airfields and easily repelled. However, several weeks before TET, one of my USMA classmates who was an Vietnamese advisor with a South Vietnamese Army unit had advised the G-2 section of the 25th DIV weeks before TET that there was a major enemy movement from Cambodia into South Vietnam. My Dad who was an assistant G-4 had just visited me in mid-January 1968 during his 1CAV logistics planning to move north later on. He had no alert about the TET offensive and got stalled in Nha Trang during the TET offensive. I did not hear about the Khe Sanh battle until I returned to the USA several months later. My classmate/roommate Bruce should have gotten a Silver Star for his team’ s heroics at the village at Khe Spahn,