In the last several articles we have discussed the bravery of the defenders on the ground in Khe Sanh village.  In this article we shall discuss the use of air support to provide a critical ingredient in the successful defense of the District Headquarters and the rendering combat ineffective a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiment.

The dense fog finally burned off in late morning.  A Marine Forward Air Controller (FAC) put in a flight of 2 F-4s to attack targets to the south of the District Headquarters.  One of the F-4s was shot down.  Following this the FAC advised that: “That’s all I can do!”

F-4 Phantom

Fortunately, part of the preparations of the defense was to establish an alternate form of communication with the Province Advisory Team in Quang Tri.  Radio contact with Quang Tri was always spotty at best, in spite of numerous efforts at antennae construction and acquisition of more powerful radios.  The Special Forces had established a radio relay site on a high hill north (hill 950) of the Khe Sanh Combat Base.  The Special Forces were able to talk to Quang Tri and thus relay messages.  CPT Clarke kept Quang Tri informed as to the status of the defense and when the Marine FAC could not provide additional air support he requested it form Quang Tri.

CPT Ward Britt (one of the advisory team’s FACs) flew his light observation aircraft through the valleys to reach Khe Sanh and to coordinate for air support.  He requested air support from air craft attacking targets along the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos.  The pilots flew below the clouds to the village.  Every time he coordinated for bombs on a target and he blew away the trees to the south he found more targets.

Forward Air Controller Aircraft

CPT Nhi was listening to one of the NVA tactical radio nets and heard a request foradditional stretchers to carry off wounded soldiers.  This was passed to CPT Britt who found the force of about 100 enemy and after another air strike he could not see any movement.  This became the norm as CPT Nhi provided target locations to CPT Clarke who then vectored CPT Britt to the target.

In the middle of this CPT Britt landed at KSCB and refueled under fire.  He remained on station until the approach of dusk.  At that point he had to return to Quang Tri.  For his bravery he was awarded the Silver Star.

CPT Clarke and CPT Nhi tried to guess where the enemy would go to regroup.  Based upon their analysis a B-52 strike was requested.  The provided a rectangle 3 kilometers long and 1 kilometer wide that was centered on the hilly area about 6-7 kilometers south of the District Headquarters.  The Province Advisory team coordinated with the Air Force and the mission was flown.  Several days later a NVA soldier deserted and was picked up by the Special Forces at Lang Vei.  He told them that his unit had been hit by the B-52 strike.

B-52

Before the B-52 strike a gun ship (Spooky—a C-47 plane that carried flares and several mini-guns) patrolled the area and engaged every target that it saw.  It was a quiet night except for some snipers.

The combination of artillery, air support and the bravery of the Bru, Vietnamese, Marine and army soldiers inside the headquarters combined to render a regiment combat ineffective.  In addition to Advisory Team 4 there were two intelligence operatives–George Amos and LT Jaime Taronji in that group of soldiers fighting in the village.  As “spooks” we saw very little of them but when the fighting started they were there.