Like many of my readers I have been following the war in Ukraine.  The introduction of new western weaponry on the battlefield has generally not had the desired effect.  The Ukrainians have not routed the Russians and given the state of play most likely won’t.  Warfare on the battlefields of Ukraine has a mixture of 21^st century and early 20^th century earmarks.

Drones and sophisticated missilry have marked much of the 21^st century warfare.  Drones have been used as weapons and as sophisticated target acquisition means.  In both cases they have been subject to successful engagement by increasing air defense capability.  Not discussed in the media, but this increased ability to engage drones means an increase in air defense target acquisition and tracking capability.  This increase has allowed for the successful engagement of many types of drones.  Drones have been used extensively by Ukraine to acquire targets and then engage them with battlefield artillery.  As the range of the engagement capabilities has increased so has the depth of the battlefield for the Ukrainians.  Drones and other intelligence collection means have provided accurate targets for engagement by increasingly more sophisticated artillery and air delivered ordnance.  For the first time we are seeing Ukraine able to engage depots of Russian supplies in western Russia.

Conversely, the Russians have not had the same level of success with their Iranian supplied drones in this type of combat or engaging targets deep in Ukraine.  The current intimidation attacks on the grain port and civilian targets near Kyiv have only been marginally successful.  The attacks on the Ukrainian grain export port and the threats against ships coming into port to export the grain are a significant escalation by Russia.  It would seem that the Russians are hoping that this escalation could cause the Ukrainians to make some concessions.  As I sit on the Danube and see empty grain barges moving towards Austria and Hungary I have to wonder if this is an alternative export means about to happen.

The time lapse between the cessation of most Russian offensive action and Ukraine’s spring/summer offense provided time for the Russians to build a classic Word War I or II defense in depth.  Trench lines in depth, minefields and booby traps characterize the Russian defenses.  Modern armor is not designed to slog through such defenses.  It is designed to exploit disruptions of the defense to conduct rapid assaults against the unprepared 3^rd echelon and logistical forces.  Open maneuver warfare on the plains of the Ukraine is much different than slogging through minefields and trench lines manned by infantry with anti-armor weapons.  The use of cluster or scatterable munitions may reduce the enemy in strong points to allow penetrations especially if they can detonate mine fields and eliminate Russian anti-armor crews. To date the jury is still out on the Ukrainian ability to figure out how to penetrate the Russian defenses.

In all this war has all of the earmarks of World War I—attrition warfare. The daily battles are characterized by a large amount of artillery being fired against sometimes fleeting targets.  It appears with superior counter battery capability, weapon accuracy and superior target acquisition capability that Ukraine’s firing of about 30% fewer rounds is having much more affect. However, in a battle of attrition the numbers are not on Ukraine’s side.  It needs to figure out how to conduct blitzkrieg like penetrations of the Russian defenses.  This maneuver warfare with superior firepower and mobility of western provided armor/mechanized equipment could be locally successful.

To have significant battlefield success the Ukrainians need to fight this hybrid type of warfare while husbanding their manpower resources to commit it in mass–not spread it over the large areas that mark the lines of contact today.  The next few months should be telling.